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EFFECTS OF INDEX INSURANCE ON DEMAND
AND SUPPLY OF CREDIT: EVIDENCE FROM
ETHIOPIA
TEMESGEN BELISSA, ROBERT LENSINK, AND ANNE WINKEL
Index-based insurance offers a climate risk management strategy that can benefit the poor. This article
focuses on whether adopting index insurance improves access to financial markets and reduces credit
rationing, using empirical analyses focused on Ethiopia. With different identification strategies, includ-
ing a newly developed method that leverages the varying availability of index insurance across areas,
the authors control for potential selection biases by forecasting potential insurance adopters; they apply
a cross-sectional double-difference method. Credit rationing can take the form of either supply-side
quantity rationing, in which case potential borrowers who need credit are involuntarily excluded from
the credit market, or demand-side rationing, such that borrowers self-select and voluntarily withdraw to
avoid transaction costs and threats to their collateral. By differentiating supply-side and demand-side
forms and employing a direct elicitation method to determine credit rationing status, this study reveals
that 38% of sample households are credit constrained. The preferred estimation techniques suggest
that index insurance significantly reduces supply-side rationing.
Key words: Credit Rationing, Ethiopia, Index Insurance; Smallholders.
JEL codes: D82, G21, G22, O13, O16, O55.
Index-based insurance (IBI) is an innovative
hedging instrument that can mitigate the risks
of drought or seasonality-based weather varia-
tions due to climate change.As an attractive fea-
ture of this innovation, the insurance payout
occurs when an objective index falls below (or
exceeds, depending on the criterion) a thresh-
old. The index usually is based on a measure of
the intensity of rainfall or direct yield measures
for a specific geographic zone covered by the
insurance contract (Carter et al. 2017). Ideally,
the index correlates closely with insured losses,
is objectively quantifiable, and is publicly verifi-
able, such that it cannot be manipulated by the
insurer or the insured (Barnett, Barrett, and
Skees 2008; Zant 2008).
Although the uptake of IBIs remains low1
(Cole et al. 2012, 2013; Hill, Hoddinott, and
Kumar 2013; Dercon et al. 2014; Takahashi
et al. 2016) and demand is generally sluggish
(Carter et al. 2017), several studies point to
its potentially substantial income, investment,
or wealth effects (Janzen and Carter 2019;
Elabed and Carter 2014; Karlan et al. 2014).
For example, IBI adoption could induce
households to make more prudent invest-
ments or manage their consumption risk bet-
ter (by stabilizing savings or accumulating
assets), which then could protect them from
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1 The low uptake of IBI might stem from the so-called basis
risk, which arises due to the imperfect correlation between com-
puted indices and actual losses (Cummins, Lalonde, and Phillips
2004; Jensen, Mude, and Barrett 2018). Especially in developing
countries, where terrestrial weather stations are sparse, the dis-
crepancy between losses indicated by the index and actual losses
realized at the farm level is high (Clarke et al. 2012).
sliding into poverty traps (Barnett, Barrett,
and Skees 2008). Moreover, because IBI
unlinks loss assessments from individual
behavior, it can avoid moral hazard and
adverse selection problems (Barnett, Barrett,
and Skees 2008; Skees 2008), which also might
improve credit access. However, virtually no
empirical evidence exists regarding how IBI
adoption affects the demand for and supply
of credit. This article offers initial insights into
the impacts of IBI on credit rationing, using
data from a drought-prone area in the Rift
Valley zone of Ethiopia.
Despite the lack of empirical evidence, some
studies offer initial insights into the potential
effects of IBI on credit rationing. In a framed
field experiment in China, Cheng (2014) studies
the effect of offering IBI to households that vol-
untarily withdraw from the credit market; all the
study participants participate in both control and
treatment games. The results demonstrate that
more than half of the farmers decide to apply
for credit when IBI is available, and roughly
two-thirds of credit diverters choose to use their
loan for productive investments rather than con-
sumption. This behavior could be explained in
several ways, with the recognition that IBI
reduces production risk, but the risk associated
with using the loan for consumption remains
constant or even might increase. In addition,
Giné and Yang (2009) randomly offered maize
farmers in Malawi either a loan or a loan with
insurance, which indemnifies them if rainfall is
insufficient. The insurance could be bought at
an actuarially fair premium. Although they
expected that farmers would prefer the insured
loan, demand for the basic loan was 13% higher
than that for the insured loan. To explain why,
these authors propose that the limited liability
clause of the basic loan provided an implicit
form of insurance. However, in contrast with
the current study, Giné and Yang (2009) do
not address the impact of a stand-alone insur-
ance product. As Carter, Cheng, and Sarris
(2016) suggest, a stand-alone insurance product
provides no additional benefits to farmers with
limited collateral. If no formal insurance is avail-
able, farmers with high collateral might be the
only ones who choose not to borrow, because
they do not want to put their collateral at risk.
Other studies focus on the impact of IBI on
credit supplies, with conflicting results. That is,
some research suggests that IBI relaxes sup-
ply-side constraints and quantity rationing,
because lenders tend to lower interest rates
and lend more to insured clients due to the
reduced default risk (Mahul and Skees 2007;
Giné and Yang 2009; McIntosh, Sarris, and
Papadopoulos 2013). But other studies suggest
that insurance could decrease both demand
for and supply of credit. Because IBI contracts
sometimes are unable to trigger payouts, even
if the insured incurs significant yield losses due
to weather risk, an inability to repay the loan
can lead to loan defaults, because cash out-
flows go to paying the premium. Alternatively,
a stand-alone insurance product could
increase the minimum welfare level to which
defaulting households can retreat. In this situ-
ation, incentives to repay diminish, because
the welfare costs of defaulting are lower.
Lenders who take loan default potential into
account thus might limit credit supply in areas
where IBI is available (Banerjee 2000; Clarke
and Dercon 2009; Farrin and Miranda 2015).
With this study, we seek to provide actual,
empirical evidence of the impact of IBI on
demand-side (i.e. risk and transaction cost
rationing) and supply-side credit rationing.
The insurance contract is a stand-alone prod-
uct, for which indemnities are paid directly to
farmers. Hence, the insurance intervention in
Ethiopia that we study is not an insurance–
credit interlinked contract. As the majority of
smallholders lack any valuable collateral to
offer, there is no real collateral at risk for most
formal borrowers.2 Thus, the intervention
seems unlikely to exert any considerable
impact on risk rationing, because insurance
cannot make borrowers who are insured by a
zero collateral default clause borrow more
nor should it have any impact on transaction
cost rationing. Therefore, we expect the adop-
tion of IBI mainly reduces supply-side, rather
than demand-side, rationing.
We use different identification strategies,
including a newly developed hybrid method.
The preferred methods suggest that index
insurance has a large, significant effect on
decreasing supply-side credit rationing. But
the impact of IBI uptake on demand-side
rationing is statistically insignificant. To estab-
lish these findings, we start in the next section
with a description of the study setting, how
IBI works, and the sampling procedure. Next,
we explain the method used to determine
credit rationing and provide estimates of credit
rationing in our sample. We present a new,
hybrid method based on a double-difference
(fixed effects) technique to estimate the impact
2 In the Online Appendix we provide more information about
the nature of the insurance contract and liability rules in Ethiopia.
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of IBI on credit rationing; we outline how it
helps address issues with traditional regression
techniques. Finally, we note some limitations
of our hybrid method, offer robustness ana-
lyses, and conclude with relevant insights.
Study Setting, Data, and Sampling
This study took place in the central Rift Valley
zone of the Oromia regional state in south-
eastern Ethiopia. The area is characterized
by plain plateaus and lowland agro-ecology.
The pattern and intensity of rainfall exhibits
considerable spatial and temporal variation,
with a bimodal distribution. Rainfall seasons
are from May to August and during October
and November. However, moisture stress
and drought frequently cause devastating crop
failures, rampant livestock mortality, and herd
collapse (Dercon, Hoddinott, and Wolde-
hanna 2005; Takahashi et al. 2016). Major
droughts in the area occurred in 2015–16, fol-
lowing historical drought trends during 1973–
74, 1983–84, 1991–92, 1999–2000, 2005–6, and
2011–12 (Dercon 2004; Takahashi et al.
2016). Households are smallholders and sub-
sistence farmers who often face drought-
induced income shocks that translate into
erratic consumption patterns (Dercon and
Christiaensen 2011; Biazin and Sterk 2013).
Formal risk management mechanisms are
inaccessible, requiring informal methods. Ex
post coping mechanisms include reducing the
frequency of meals, distress livestock sales,
halting the purchase of fertilizer and improved
seeds, forcing pupils to withdraw from school
for casual labor, renting land and family labor
to local landlords, and seeking wage-based
employment on floriculture farms held by for-
eign investors. These mechanisms are costly
and limited in scope (Dercon 2004).
IBI in the Study Area
In 2013, the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) and Oromia Insurance Com-
pany (OIC) jointly implemented IBI for crops
in the Rift Valley zone of Ethiopia to improve
the resilience of households, in the face of cli-
mate change. The product was designed by
CelsiusPro Ag and Swiss Re using satellite
weather data with 10 × 10 km grids for the
period 1983–2012. It was implemented in five
districts: Boset, Bora, Ilfata, Adamitullu-
Jido-Kombolcha (AJK), and Arsi Negele.
The selection of which kebeles3 to cover in each
district reflected several criteria, including rain-
fall shortages, the relevance of the area for crop
production, and food security. The specific selec-
tion process worked as follows: first, before the
initial intervention in 2013, the OIC, JICA, and
Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture discussed
and identified districts in which drought shocks
are common. Most of these districts are located
in theRiftValley zone. Second, the three organi-
zations entered into focus group discussionswith
representative farmers from each kebele within
each selected district. From these discussions,
they identified kebeles with severe drought
experience in the past. Third, the financial sup-
port that JICA allotted for the 2013 weather
index insurance intervention was not adequate
to cover all the identified drought-prone kebeles
at the same time, so the kebeles that would be
subject to the first intervention in 2013 versus
during later interventions were selected through
discussion among the three organizations.4
The product is marketed and sold twice per
year, in April and September, which are the
months preceding the two rainy seasons. It
provides coverage against losses during the
seedling and flowering stages of crop growth.
Major targeted stable food crops include
maize, wheat, barley, and teff. During each
sales period, a household that decides to buy
IBI pays a premium of ETB5 100 per policy.
The payout is determined according to the
level of normalized difference vegetation
index, measured using satellite data for a spec-
ified period. The exact trigger and exit level
differ for each kebele and in each season. A
20%markup on the actuary fair premium also
is included in the contract, to cover selling and
administrative costs (loading factor).6 Selling
costs are incurred by the sales agents, such as
3 A kebele is the smallest administrative unit, within districts
(Woreda), in Ethiopia.
4 We tried to obtain details about how the kebeles to be served
first were selected. The official answer of OIC was that it was ran-
dom, but the organization could not specify how the randomiza-
tion was conducted. It seems more likely that the final selection
was based on informal criteria, influenced by the group
discussions.
5 ETB (Ethiopian Birr), 1USD = 32 ETB.
6 This mark-up rate is relatively low compared with other prod-
ucts in developing countries, which reflects a practical challenge: a
higher mark-up rate that takes all catastrophic risks and uncer-
tainty into account would increase the product price too high, rel-
ative to farmers’ reservation prices. Thus, the product does not
meet safe minimum quality standards, in the sense that high insur-
ance prices might prompt farmers to prefer self-insurance (Carter
et al. 2017).
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cooperative unions. The actuarially fair pre-
mium of the insurance product is ETB 100
per policy for a maximum payout of about
ETB 667 to cover full losses. The 20%markup
is paid by JICA, so farmers only pay the actu-
arially fair premium of ETB 100 per policy.
According to OIC sales records, before Sep-
tember 2014 (start of the data collection
period), approximately 5,000 households in
more than thirty kebeles across five districts
had purchased IBI; plans were in place to
expand into many other adjacent kebeles in
each district. The intervention plan in subse-
quent periods involved intensifying coverage
of the kebeles in the five districts, then expand-
ing into other districts. Our newly developed
hybrid identification strategy, which we
explain subsequently, reflects these expansion
plans.
Sampling
We used a multistage, random sampling tech-
nique with probability proportional to size.
Concretely, we selected three districts (Bora,
AJK, and Arsi Negele) out of the five districts
covered by the IBI project. Then we identified
a random sample of kebeles covered by IBI in
these three districts. From the AJK district, we
also selected two kebeles (Qamo Garbi and
Desta Abijata) where IBI was not yet avail-
able.7 Noting our available budget, we decided
to survey approximately 1,200 households,
selected proportional to the sample size of
the study from all kebeles identified. We also
oversampled households from the treatment
kebeles to ensure sufficient actual adopters in
the sample. That is, we took larger samples in
the treatment kebeles than the control
kebeles, proportional to the size of the kebeles
in both groups. We used random sampling
within the treatment and control kebeles. For
each kebele, we randomly selected the sample
from a roster of farmers; for simplicity, we
adopted a systematic random sampling tech-
nique and randomly selected the first farmer
from the roster then the next nth farmers from
the list.
Prior to our study, JICA andOIC organized
product promotion campaigns in both the
treatment and expansion kebeles to enhance
uptake (and future uptake). In both the treat-
ment and control kebeles, an estimated 70%
of the farmers attended a product promotion
meeting. Such product promotion campaigns
are common tactics to roll out new insurance
products.
The final sample consists of 1,143 house-
holds: 812 from the treatment and 331 from
the control kebeles. Of the 812 households
from the treatment kebeles, 459 adopted and
353 did not adopt IBI over the 2013–14 period.
This relatively high percentage of adopters
can be explained by the well-attended product
promotion campaigns. As table 1 indicates, an
average household in the treatment kebeles
that bought IBI was headed by a 39-year-old
manwho had about two years of formal educa-
tion. The average number of family members
is seven, four of whom have reached produc-
tive age, with three who are either preschool
children or aged dependents. On average,
these households travel approximately two
hours to access public services, including mar-
ket centers and financial institutions.
Although some differences arise with house-
holds that do not buy insurance in the treat-
ment kebeles compared with households in
the control kebeles, these differences are
small. Yet, as will also be shown in table 4
below, this does not imply that treatment and
control kebeles are similar in terms of various
poverty indicators.
Methodology
If rural financial markets were perfectly com-
petitive, with symmetric information and cost-
less enforcement, lenders could arrange
conditional credit contracts according to bor-
rowers’ behaviors. However, rural financial
markets in developing countries often feature
information asymmetries, leading to moral
hazard and adverse selection problems, as well
as higher transaction costs associated with
loan monitoring and contract enforcement
(Jaffee and Russell 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss
1981; Vandell 1984; Bester 1985; Williamson
1986; Besanko and Thakor 1987; Lensink
and Sterken 2002; Boucher, Carter, and Guir-
kinger 2008). These classic incentive problems
make conditional credit contracts restrictive
and infeasible (Dowd 1992; Ghosh,
7 These two kebeles had been identified for potential future
interventions. The presence of just two kebeles in the control con-
dition reflects our assumption that between-kebele variation
explains only minimal differences across individuals. However,
as local administrative boundaries in Ethiopia, kebeles have vary-
ing size, and the two kebeles we selected to serve as controls both
contain large populations, such that the samples taken from them
constitutes about one-third of the total respondents, proportional
to the total households, in both groups of kebeles.
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Mookherjee, and Ray 2000; Lensink and Ster-
ken 2001; Conning and Udry 2007).
Rural financial markets also typically are
characterized by credit rationing, such that
lenders set a ceiling and avoid extending addi-
tional credit, even if borrowers are willing to
pay higher rates of interest. If borrowers are
credit constrained, greater access to credit
can facilitate investment. The ability to borrow
also constitutes a major source of private
insurance against consumption fluctuations
that arise due to idiosyncratic shocks in rural
areas though, so credit rationing can have
far-reaching, adverse welfare consequences,
including decreased consumption smoothing
(Morduch 1995; Zimmerman and Carter
2003) and limited investments in high-risk,
high-return inputs or applications of expensive
resources such as chemical fertilizer (Beegle,
Dehejia, and Gatti 2003; Guarcello, Mealli,
and Rosati 2010; Hill, Hoddinott, and Kumar
2013; McIntosh, Sarris, and Papadopoulos
2013). Credit-constrained households might
be forced to lower their expenditures on nutri-
tion, which may lead to persistent health out-
comes, such as stunted child development
(Islam and Maitra 2012). Reducing access to
credit, as a tool to smooth household income
fluctuations, also can prompt school dropouts,
due to the need for increased child labor on
landlord farms. This step lowers the level of
human capital development (Beegle, Dehejia,
and Gatti 2003; Guarcello, Mealli, and Rosati
2010). Exposure to repeated downturns and
inaccessible credit thus reinforces vulnerabil-
ity and perpetuates poverty by shaping both
the behaviors of and outcomes for the poor.
Credit rationing can take the form of either
supply-side quantity rationing, in which case
potential borrowers who need credit are invol-
untarily excluded from the credit market, even
though they would be willing to pay higher
interest rates, or demand-side rationing, such
that borrowers self-select and voluntarily with-
draw from the creditmarket to avoid transaction
costs and threats to their collateral (Bester 1987;
Boucher, Carter, and Guirkinger 2008).
Demand-side credit rationing thus includes both
risk and transaction cost rationing. Risk ration-
ing is prevalent in the absence of insurance mar-
kets when lenders shift contractual risks to
borrowers; borrowers respond by voluntarily
withdrawing from the market, even though the
value of their collateral is sufficient to qualify
them for a loan contract (Boucher and Guirkin-
ger 2007; Boucher, Carter, and Guirkinger
2008). Similarly, transaction cost rationing arises
when the costs of waiting for, processing, and
administering the loan are too high for bor-
rowers (Boucher, Guirkinger, and Trivelli
2009). Noting these several definitions of credit
rationing, we use a direct elicitation method
(DEM; Boucher, Guirkinger, and Trivelli
2009) to identify the credit rationing status of
each household. With this method, we can iden-
tify credit-constrained households according to
their decision to borrow and the lender’s deci-
sion to supply credit.
Therefore, the credit rationing module starts
by asking whether the respondent has applied
for a formal loan in the past five years. If so, it
asks whether the application has been accepted.
Households that have not applied for a formal
loan indicate their reasons for not applying.
According to their responses, all households
can be categorized into one of four mutually
exclusive groups: credit unconstrained, quantity
(or supply-side) rationed, risk rationed, and
transaction cost rationed.Households that apply
for formal loans and receive them are catego-
rized as unconstrained. However, if households
applied for (more) credit at the prevailing inter-
est rate and their application was rejected, they
are classified as quantity rationed. If households
Table 1. Sample Characteristics







39.4 0.8 2.5 0.5 1.7
Treatment kebeles
(non-adopters)
38.1 0.9 2.3 0.5 1.7
Control kebeles 37.8 0.8 2.3 0.5 1.5
t-statistic −1.3 −2.6*** −2.4*** 2.1** −1.1
Observations 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,143
Note: The statistics in table 1 refer to the mean of adopters in the treatment kebeles; the mean of non-adopters in the treatment kebeles; and the mean for
households in the control (expansion) kebele. The t-statistic refers to a comparison between Treatment kebeles (average) and Control Kebeles. ***p < 0.01.
**p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.
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have not applied for a formal loan in the past five
years, because the bank branch is too far from
their homes or the application procedure involves
toomuchpaperwork andwaiting time,we catego-
rize them as transaction cost rationed. If instead
households do not apply for loans because they
do not want to offer their house or other assets
as collateral that might be taken by the bank, we
consider them risk rationed. Some households
that are able to borrow do not apply because they
do not need credit; they are credit unconstrained.
Finally, households that would have applied for
loan, had they known the bank would lend to
them, are another group of supply-side rationed
households.We combine the risk- and transaction
cost–rationed households into a group of
demand-constrained households; then we com-
bine the demand-constrained and supply-con-
strained households into a larger group of credit-
constrained households. Figure A1 in Appendix
I presents a tree diagram of questions leading to
the final categorization of each household.
Credit Access in the Sample
Using the DEM, we identify the credit rationing
status of each household in our sample. Table 2
summarizes the results. Approximately 38% of
the households are credit constrained, of which
20.5% are quantity constrained and 18% are
demand constrained.8 The table also differenti-
ates kebeles with and without access to index
insurance, revealing that the percentage of
households that are credit constrained is higher
in the kebeles with access to index insurance
than in the kebeles without it. The same trend
holds for the percentage of households that are
quantity constrained. However, we hasten to
add that this finding does not necessarily mean
that access to index insurance (like an intention
to treat analysis) leads to more credit rationing.
Specification of the Regression Model
To clarify our approach, we specify the follow-
ing fixed effect model:
ð1Þ yi = β0 + β1Ii + αtDti + αwDwi + μi
 
,
where the dependent variable y refers to a
farmer-level outcome (credit rationing) for
farmer (observation) i; Ii is a binary variable
that takes a value of 1 if i is insured; Dti is a
binary variable equal to 1 if i is the type who
would endogenously buy insurance, such that
it reflects a fixed effect for those who would
buy, irrespective of whether insurance is avail-
able; Dwi refers to a fixed effect for treatment
kebeles, which is also a binary variable, equal
to 1 if i is in a kebele where index insurance
is available, indicating the program was
endogenously placed; and μi is an error term.





, so Equation 1 is equivalent to a dou-
ble difference model (as we explain subse-
quently when detailing the preferredmethod).
Our main aim is to obtain an unbiased esti-
mate of β1, which may be hindered by self-
selection or program placement biases. There-
fore, before presenting our preferred
approach, we briefly discuss the nature of
these biases, as they arise under standard esti-
mation techniques. Table 3 presents the
results of these estimates. To start, we run
naïve ordinary least square (OLS) regressions
with and without controls, using only data
from the treatment kebeles where the pro-
gram was endogenously placed, which implies
that from Equation 1, the termsαtDti + α
wDwi
drop out. By using data from the treatment
kebeles only, we compare credit rationing by
farmers who bought insurance against the
credit rationing of their neighbors who delib-
erately decided not to take part in the insur-
ance program. An OLS estimator in this case
is likely biased due to self-selection. Self-selec-
tion based on unobservable variables is the
problem; adding explanatory variables may
control for selection on observables. The
OLS estimators of β1 would be downwardly
biased if participants in the insurance program
are previously more credit constrained, even
before they have the option to buy insurance,
and if credit constrained farmers are more
willing to participate in the insurance program.
This bias is particularly likely for supply-side
credit constraints, in that intuitively, supply-
side–constrained farmers (with observable
and unobservable characteristics that make
them credit constrained) would want to buy
insurance, because they lack the option to
use credit to protect themselves against crop
loss, such as due to a drought. Regarding
8 This credit rationing level (38%) is relatively lower than that
found in Peru (55.4% in 1997; 43.6% in 2003; Boucher, Guirkin-
ger, and Trivelli 2009). Quantity rationing accounts for 20.5% in
our study, versus 36.6% in 1997 and 10.4% in 2003 in Peru. Simi-
larly, demand rationing is 17.8% in our case but was 18.8% in
1997 and 33.2% in 2003 in Peru.
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demand-side credit rationing, the nature of the
bias is less clear in advance; in this case,
farmers voluntarily withdraw from the credit
market. To learn about the nature of the selec-
tion bias on unobservables, we can compare β1
for the OLS estimates with and without con-
trols, assuming that the extent of selection on
the observed explanatory variables provides
an indication of the extent of selection on the
unobservables. It appears that β1 is insignifi-
cant for the different credit rationing variables
in all OLS regressions, with and without con-
trols, yet it is more negative for the estimates
with controls, compared with those without
controls, for overall credit rationing and for
supply-side credit rationing. The decrease in
β1 for supply-side credit rationing is notably
big, from +0.007 to−0.047, which suggests that
the OLS estimator of β1 for supply-side credit
rationing is biased downward, and the OLS
estimate of β1 underestimates the supply-side
credit constraints, thereby reducing the effects
of insurance. For demand-side credit ration-
ing, the increase in β1 from −0.021 to 0.024 is
insignificant. Except for kebele fixed effects,
none of the explanatory variables in the out-
come equation for demand-side credit ration-
ing is significant, so we are hesitant to draw
conclusions regarding the nature of the bias
of the estimate of β1 in this case.
As further evidence that the OLS estimator
of β1 is biased downward, especially for sup-
ply-side credit constraints, we also compared
the naïveOLS estimates with an estimator that
controls (partly) for endogenous self-selec-
tion. With an endogenous treatment regres-
sion model (ETRM), we assume a linear
model for the outcome and allow for correla-
tion structures between unobservable vari-
ables that affect the treatment and outcomes
(see Heckman 1976, 1978; Wooldridge 2010).
The estimation of this endogenous binary vari-
able model includes equations for the outcome
variable and the endogenous treatment (adop-
tion of index insurance). The endogenous treat-
ment model suggests that IBI lowers overall
credit rationing, but the impact is insignificant
(yet more negative than the OLS estimates). It
also indicates a significant, negative effect on
supply-side credit rationing, such that uptake of











Credit rationed 0.382 0.400 0.338 0.05 (0.26)
Quantity rationed 0.205 0.228 0.148 0.002 (0.05)




Note: In the last column, comparing the means for the treatment and control kebeles, the first value is the p-value using normal standard errors; the second (in
brackets) is the p-value based on cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at kebele level).
Table 3. Impact of IBI on Credit Rationing

























Controls No Yes Yes No No
Treatment equation No No Yes No No
Note: The sample is the treatment kebeles for OLS1, OLS2, and ETRM but the treatment and control kebeles for ITT. OLS = ordinary least squares,
ETRM = endogenous treatment regression models, and ITT = intention to treat estimator. Cluster-robust (kebele cluster) standard errors are in brackets. OLS1
is estimated without controls. The controls for the other regressions in the outcome equation are Age, Education (years), Family size, Extension contact,
District1, District2, Dependency ratio, Dependents, Coop member, and kebele fixed effects (see Table A1). For overall credit rationing and supply-side credit
rationing only coopmember (negative sign) and kebele fixed effects are significant; for demand-side credit rationing, only kebele fixed effects are significant. The
controls in the (endogenous) treatment (uptake) equation are specified in Table 6.
1 Significant at 5%.
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IBI reduces credit rationing by approximately
12%, whereas the effect on demand-side credit
rationing remains insignificant. The substantial
difference between the OLS regression results
and the endogenous treatment model results
imply that selection on unobservables probably
has an important role.9
Considering the difficulty of ruling out
selection biases using observations in the
treatment kebeles only, we derive estimates
using data from the control kebeles as well.
A straightforward method to address selection
biases is to conduct intention to treat (ITT)
analyses. For Equation 1, this method would
exclude β1Ii + α
tDti. The ITT estimate is given
by αw. Moreover, we could estimate the impact
of actual uptake of insurance by using the
treatment kebeles as an instrument to estimate
Ii, which would give us the local average treat-
ment effect (LATE). The main disadvantage
of these estimators is that they only provide
unbiased estimates if we ignore endogenous
program placements and assume program
placement was (nearly) random. However, as
we have explained, the selection of treatment
and control kebeles was not entirely random,
so the ITT and LATE estimates may suffer
from program placement bias. Table 4 com-
pares the averages for the treatment and con-
trol kebeles in terms of population density10
and poverty indicators, such as housing condi-
tions,11 being a beneficiary of a productive
safety net program (PSNP), a wealth index,12
livestock sizes,13 and an indicator of access to
non-farm employment. The table offers strong
evidence of program placement bias, because
the treatment and control kebeles differ on
various poverty indicators, including housing
quality, PSNP dependence, wealth indexes,
and the dependency ratio. The ITT and LATE
approaches therefore are problematic and not
appropriate. Yet, their estimates suggest that
access to index insurance does not significantly
affect overall or demand-side credit rationing.
Surprisingly, in contrast with the OLS and
ETRM results, the ITT and LATE estimates
suggests that IBI access attenuates supply-side
credit rationing.14 However, these results logi-
cally appear more likely to measure differ-
ences between control and treatment kebeles
than unbiased impacts of (having access to)
insurance.
A New Hybrid Method: Double Difference in
Space
The final method we introduce is our newly
developed hybrid approach, in line with a dou-
ble-difference model. This approach can be
summarized as follows:
1. We consider households (adopters and
non-adopters of IBI) in areas where IBI is
currently available (treatment kebeles).
2. We consider households in areaswhere IBI is
not yet available, which represent potential
future clients, according to the insurance
company (control kebeles; the expansion
area for the insurance company).
3. Using the sample of households in the
treatment kebeles (where IBI is available),
we estimate propensity to adopt and then
conduct an out-of-sample forecast of
“expected” adopters and expected non-
adopters in the control kebeles (expansion
area where IBI is not yet available). To
conduct the out-of-sample forecasts, all var-
iables in the equation used to estimate pro-
pensities to adopt in the treatment kebeles
also need to be (and are) available for the
expansion (control) kebeles.
4. We estimate the impact of IBI on credit
rationing with a double-difference method
in a cross-sectional framework, with three
comparisons: (a) predicted adopters and
predicted non-adopters in the treatment
area (we use predicted adopters instead of
actual adopters, because unobserved fac-
tors may both increase uptake and affect
9 The advantage of the endogenous treatment model is clear: it
provides, with certain assumptions, unbiased estimates of the
impact in the case of endogenous selection. However, the reliabil-
ity of this model depends on the variables used to determine the
endogenous treatment. The reliability of the outcomes depends
on whether the exclusion restrictions hold. It is debatable if the
exclusion restriction holds in our case.
10 We measured population density as the ratio of households’
family size to land size. Households in areas that have dispersed
population density may have more land, which may offer them
better economic opportunities. We calculate the net size of land
possessed or owned by the household from the details of land
owned by the household adjusted for land rented in, rented out,
sharecropped in, and sharecropped out. Comparing the treatment
and control kebeles on the ratio of family size to land provides a
good proxy for the economic implications of population density.
11 We proxied housing quality with a variable that indicates
whether the household owns an iron corrugated house. In Ethio-
pia, iron corrugated houses represent an improvement over thatch
houses.
12 To construct the wealth index, we use information about var-
ious plant asset compositions (i.e. farm implements, including har-
rows, plows, sickles, and spades, as well as household assets such as
radios, televisions, or motorcycles) owned by households, together
with the salvage value of each asset in our data set.
13 Livestock owned by the household is measured in TLU,
which is a standard unit. 14 Note that the LATE is a transformation of the ITT estimator.
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credit rationing); (b) predicted adopters
and predicted non-adopters in the control
area, and (c) the differences of a with b.
Thus, our approach combines propensity
scores with difference-in-difference (DiD)
estimators to improve identifications when
baseline data are not available.15 To the best
of our knowledge, no empirical studies have
used this approach previously to estimate
the impact of insurance.16 This method aims
to reveal the extent to which predicted
adopters in the treatment area benefit more
than predicted non-adopters in the treatment
area, relative to the difference between pre-
dicted adopters and non-adopters in the con-
trol area.
The DiD elements of our approach are
similar to those of a standard DiD, which
would compare between years and partici-
pants and non-participants, whereas DiD in
a cross-sectional setting compares program
and non-program villages, and then target
and non-target groups (e.g. Coleman 1999;
Armendariz and Morduch 2010; Khandkar,
Koolwal, and Samad 2010).17 In our case,
the DiD involves a comparison of the
difference between the outcomes of farmers
who take up insurance and those who do
not, in areas where insurance is available,
against the outcomes of farmers who (would
like to) take up insurance and farmers who
do not (want to) take up insurance in areas
where insurance is not yet available. Table 5
provides an illustration. We consider
kebeles where insurance is available (1)
and kebeles without insurance access (2).
In the former, we know who participates
(takes up insurance, group A) and who does
not (group C). In the latter, we identify a
group that likely would participate if insur-
ance were available (group D) and a group
that probably would not participate even if

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15 Note that DiD requires a parallel trends assumption, and
propensity score matching assumes that selection is driven by fac-
tors that can be observed.
16 Cecchi, Duchoslav, and Bulte (2016) use a somewhat similar
method; they do not explore double differences, but they assess
the impact of health insurance on public good contributions by
comparing (predicted) adopters and non-adopters across villages
with and without access to health insurance.
17 Our method most closely resembles that applied by Coleman
(1999). That is, we leverage the expansion strategy shared by the
organization and estimate a double-difference model in space.
However, Coleman has ex ante information about future adopters
in the control region, whereas we lack this information and thus
must estimate future adopters by using an out-of-sample forecast.
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By comparing groups A and D, we can
address selection bias at the household level.
That is, the characteristics of participants and
(expected) participants should be similar, so
the difference between these two groups
reflects the impact of insurance availability.
Yet a simple comparison of the means
obtained from groupsA andD cannot address
potential biases due to non-random program
placement, which may be a serious issue if
the order in which the insurance company
serves the different areas is not random.
Therefore, we use DiD to compare group A
with C and group D with B, then take the dif-
ference between the two comparisons. For-
mally, the DiD estimate is (YA – YC) – (YD –
YB), where Y represents the outcome variable
(e.g. access to credit), and the subscripts repre-
sent the groups.
We estimate this DiD estimator in a regres-
sion framework, using Equation 1 (including
controls). Technically, the procedure ensures
that unobservables related to treatment status
and to the treatment area difference out. How-
ever, it does not difference out error terms that
are specific to both adopter status and treated
kebeles. It is straightforward to assert that a
key assumption of our approach is that the dif-
ference between unobservables of adopters
and non-adopters in the treatment area is the
same as the difference between unobservables
of would-be adopters and would-be non-
adopters in the control area; we subsequently
test this assumption using selection tests. If it
holds, the coefficient for the interaction term
(β1) provides an unbiased estimate of the
impact of adopting index insurance on credit
rationing.
Finally, because we predict adopters, it is
important to note that Dti in Equation 1 is a
generated regressor, which may lead to biased
standard errors if we estimate the equation
using OLS. Therefore, we use a bootstrapping
procedure to determine standard errors. Spe-
cifically, we wrote a stata.ado program that
enables us to estimate Equation 1 simulta-
neously with the procedures to estimate
expected adopters in the control kebeles
(steps 1–3 in the next section), as well as boot-
strap the entire process. More details (and the
stata.ado file) are available on request.
Results: Identifying Expected Adopters
A major challenge associated with our pro-
posed method is the need to identify both
expected future adopters and expected future
non-adopters in the control kebeles. We iden-
tify expected adopters in the control kebeles
by using estimates of the propensity to adopt
from the treatment kebeles in a four-step
procedure.
Identification Procedure
Step 1. To estimate the propensity to adopt in
the treatment area, we consider the decision
to buy IBI. The utility difference of having
IBI or not depends on the vector of character-
istics Z. This utility difference can be written
for each household as a function of observed
characteristics Z and unobserved characteris-
tics εij. Assuming a linear additive relationship,
we obtain.
ð2Þ Dt*i = βZi + εi,
where Dt*i is an unobserved latent variable.
We assume the household buys IBI if the util-
ity difference exceeds 0. Consequently:
Dti = 1 adoption of IBIð Þ ifDt*i > 0:
Dti = 0 noadoption of IBIð Þ ifDt*i ≤ 0:
We also assume a logistic distribution of the
εi values and estimate the equation with a
binary logit model.
The results of estimating the determinants
of IBI uptake using Equation 2 are in table 6.
The estimates suggest that older (marginally
significant) and female household heads
exhibit a higher probability of adopting than
younger and male-headed households. As we
expected, the higher the Basis risk, measured
by the distance of the household farm to the
nearest metrological station measured in
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walking hours, the lower the probability to
adopt insurance. However, this effect is insig-
nificant,18 probably because of its high correla-
tion with Present-bias or procrastination,
measured by a binary dummy, equal to 1 for
households that indicate that, if insurance is
available, they would postpone the uptake
decision until the final insurance sales day to
make a better estimate of future weather con-
ditions. This indicator measures whether
households wait until the sales deadline, so
that they can better forecast future weather
conditions and then make their insurance
uptake decisions.19 Attending insurance pro-
motion meetings positively affects uptake,
according to the positive, significant coeffi-
cient for Insurance product promotion mea-
sured by a dummy variable equal to 1 for
households that participated in a product pro-
motion meeting (campaign) of JICA and OIC
and 0 for those that did not participate. We
consider Education, Family size, Cooperative
membership, and Draft oxen, but only Family
size and Draft oxen (marginally) are signifi-
cant. The uptake equation thus appears able
to separate adopters from non-adopters, as
reflected by the area under the receiver oper-
ating characteristic (ROC) curve, which is
equal to 0.84.
A crucial assumption of our proposed
method is that selection effects due to unob-
servables can be controlled for by adding a
dummy variable that indicates which farmers
are adopters and would-be adopters. How-
ever, if our results turn out to be sensitive to
a misclassification of (would-be) adopters,
selection effects may seriously bias the results.
To determine whether the results are sensitive
to the precise specification of the uptake equa-
tion, we consider two alternative specifica-
tions, in which we add more variables to
control for the potential omitted variable bias.
First, we add three control variables: Peer
influence, Risk aversion (CRRA), and Time
preference. Peer influence is measured by a
dummy, equal to 1 for households that indi-
cate that their peers, relatives, or neighbors
who have bought insurance have influenced
them to buy IBI, and 0 for others. In the
expansion area, households indicated whether
peer influence has convinced them to buy at
the moment the insurance becomes available.
For exact definitions of Risk and Time prefer-
ence, see Table A1. Households may be more
willing to adopt insurance if some of their
peers already have bought it (Peer influence).
Risk aversion likely negatively affects uptake,
which may sound counterintuitive but is in line
with studies that cite trust issues;20 apparently,
more risk-averse households do not trust
insurance, so they are less willing to adopt it.
Finally, the relationship between Time prefer-
ence and uptake is positive21 but insignifi-
cant.22 Second, in another uptake regression,
we ignore Peer influence, which could be
affected by insurance: if somebody buys IBI,
there are potentially more peers available that
may positively affect other purchasers or non-
purchasers. As we show in the online Appen-
dix, Table S1 (Equations 1 and 2), the perfor-
mance of the alternative uptake equations, in
terms of R-square values and the ROC curve,
are similar to that of our preferred uptake
equation.
Step 2. Using Equation 2 and the estimation
specified in table 6, we conduct an out-of-sam-
ple forecast to predict the propensity to adopt
in the control area.23
Step 3. To identify expected future adopters
and expected future non-adopters in the con-
trol area, we endogenously set a threshold
value of the probability to adopt, above which
a farmer is classified as an expected adopter
according to the optimization of the so-called
Youden Index (Youden 1950). This index esti-
mates the probability of an informed decision,
rather than a random guess and thus provides
a measure of discriminatory power. It is calcu-
lated as sensitivity + specificity − 1, where sen-
sitivity (or true positive rate) measures the
proportion of correctly classified positives,
18 Basis risk becomes significant if we drop the Present-bias or
procrastination variable from the model. The main results hold
for three alternative models: (a) both variables included, (b) only
basis risk included, or (c) only Present-bias or procrastination
included.
19 In a given insurance sales period (e.g., 45 days), some house-
holds might wait to make their purchase decision until the 44th or
45th day, at which point they have the most updated information
about future rainfall. Similar behavior, such that farmers update
their rainfall beliefs in response to external forecasts, is documen-
ted by Lybbert et al. (2007).
20 Risk aversion is derived from an incentivized lab-in-the-field
experiment that we conducted to assess risk attitudes. It includes a
multiple price list protocol that requires participants to choose
between a safe and a risky option (50/50 probability; Binswanger
1980). More details are available on request.
21 Our time preference indicator comes from a time preference
game we played with all households in the sample.
22 We do not drop insignificant variables from the uptake equa-
tions, so they still may affect the predicted outcomes.
23 All variables in Step 1 are available for both the treatment
and control kebeles, so out-of-sample forecasts are possible. This
option also holds for the binary variable Insurance product promo-
tion, because during our survey, the insurance company already
had conducted promotional meetings in the expansion (control)
kebeles.
Belissa, Lensink and Winkel Index Insurance and Credit Rationing 1521
and specificity (or true negative rate) mea-
sures the proportion of correctly classified
negatives. If the model perfectly predicts
farmers with and without insurance, sensitivity
and specificity take values of 100% and 100%.
In turn, the Youden Index is defined between
0 and 1; it is equal to 0 if a test is deemed use-
less (i.e. the classification model gives the
same proportion of positive results for farmers
with and without insurance). For this study, we
calculate specificity and sensitivity within-sam-
ple, whereas they are normally measured out-
of-sample. We set a threshold value of 0.626
for our preferred uptake equation.
Step 4. We reclassify adopters in the treatment
area, using the same method. Table 7 compares
the percentages of predicted and actual adopters
in the treatment areawith thepredicted expected
adopters in the control area if we use our pre-
ferred uptake equation. The predicted percent-
age of adopters equals 60% for the treatment
kebeles and 68% for the control kebeles.
Selection Test (Balance Test)
To test the reliability of our method, we con-
duct selection tests that indicate if the selection
process is similar in the treatment and control
kebeles. The selection tests require variables
that have not been affected by the actual and
predicted uptake of IBI (i.e., exogenous vari-
ables), so they should not include variables
already in the uptake equation. The selection
tests also need to consider characteristics of
households that bought and did not buy IBI.
We therefore address (ZA – ZC) – (ZD – ZB),
where Z represents exogenous variables and
the subscripts refer to the different groups. In
a regression framework, we estimate.
ð3Þ Zi = c+ αDti + βDWi + γDtiDWi + μi,
where α captures differences between predicted
adopters and predicted non-adopters, and β cap-
tures differences between the kebeles with and
without access to IBI;Dti and D
W
i are as defined
previously. The parameter of interest is γ, which
captures differences between adopters and non-
adopters beyond differences already accounted
for by α and β. An insignificant γ implies that
the selection process in the two areas is similar
in terms of observables. The selection balancing
tests use the results from table 6.
As table 8 shows, with the exception of years
of education, the selection tests suggest that all
variables are balanced, which provides addi-
tional confidence in our approach and for our
identification strategy. Adopters in the treat-
ment region have slightly more education than
expected adopters in the control kebeles.24 To
control for possible biases due to this difference,
we addEducation (years) as a control variable in
the credit rationing regressions.
Impact of IBI on Credit Rationing
We assess the impact of IBI on credit rationing
in general according to a binary logit estimate
and a linear probability model.25 Table 9 pre-
sents the results; they suggest that farmers
who adopt IBI are less credit rationed, as indi-
cated by the significant negative coefficient for
Table 6. Determinants of Uptake in
Treatment Kebeles
Variables Uptake
Education (years) 0.028 (0.03)
Family size 0.120***
(0.038)
Coop member 0.218 (0.325)
Draft oxen 0.105* (0.054)
Basis risk −0.0145 (0.042)





Present-bias or procrastination 0.717***
(0.188)
District 1 −0.294 (0.301)




Area under ROC curve 0.84




Note: Cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets. The cutoff value for a
positive classification is based on maximizing the Youden Index. ***p < 0.01.
**p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.
24 With large samples, a t-test (and our approach) may reveal
imbalances, even if the differences are small. If the number of
observations is very small, a null hypothesis of equal means may
not be rejected, even if the differences are relatively big. There-
fore, testing for balance requires consideration of the magnitude
of the coefficient too. In our case, years of education is about 1–
2 years longer for adopters in the treatment area, which seems rel-
atively small. Imbens (2015) suggests using normalized differences
as an alternative test for balance.
25 Theoretically, IBI could induce lenders to reduce interest
rates. However, we find no evidence of this action in our survey
area. It appears that lenders do not properly price risk.
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the interaction term. Its estimated parameter
value is −0.957, indicating that adoption of
IBI decreases the log-odds of being credit
rationed by 0.957, holding all other covariates
constant.26 Similarly, the OLS regression
shows that IBI adoption decreases total credit
rationing by 20%.
We further investigate the impact of IBI by
differentiating between demand- and supply-
side constraints. That is, to assess the impact
of IBI on credit demand- and supply-side
rationing, we use a multinomial logit model,
with credit-unconstrained households as the
base. Table 9 shows that uptake of IBI signifi-
cantly reduces supply-side rationing. The esti-
mated parameter value for the interaction
term is −0.589 for supply-side credit rationing,
indicating that IBI adoption decreases the
multinomial log-odds of being credit con-
strained (relative to credit unconstrained) by
0.589. For a clearer interpretation of the
impact of adopting insurance on being sup-
ply-side credit rationed, we exponentiate the
coefficient (0.589) to obtain the relative risk
ratio, which produces a value of 1.8. There-
fore, the relative risk (or odds) of being non-
credit rationed rather than supply-side credit
rationed among IBI holders is about two times
the corresponding relative probability for non-
IBI holders with the same characteristics (e.g.
education, age, family size). For the ease of
interpretation, we also estimated a simple
OLS specification for supply-side rationing.
This regression suggests that the probability
of being supply-side credit rationed is approx-
imately 6% lower for IBI holders compared to
non-IBI holders, which is lower than the 12%
suggested by the endogenous selection model
but still sizeable. Perhaps lending institutions
extend more credit supply to insured house-
holds, which can earn indemnity payments
from IBI that enhance their potential ability
to repay the loan. Therefore, the loan applica-
tions of insured households may evoke better
acceptance among lenders. Although we also
find a negative effect of IBI adoption on
demand-side credit rationing, the impact is
not significant at conventional significance
levels.
Limitations and Robustness Analyses
The main results suggest that adopting IBI
causes farmers to be less credit rationed;
uptake of IBI negatively affects both supply-
side and demand-side credit rationing. How-
ever, only the impact on supply-side credit
rationing seems significant. Our approach is
based on some important assumptions though,
including the prediction that selection
effects due to unobservables can be con-
trolled for by adding a dummy variable that
indicates which farmers are adopters and
would-be adopters.27 Moreover, to deter-
mine the likelihood of being treated and
non-treated, we estimate an adoption equa-
tion, but the coefficients in the uptake equa-
tion will be biased if the unobserved
characteristics affecting adoption also affect
being credit constrained and correlate with
the observed characteristics in the adoption
equation.28 In such a case, our approach
would be invalidated.
No straightforwardmethod exists to test this
underlying assumption, so we rely on a series
Table 7. Adopters and Non-Adopters by Area
Treatment area Percentage Control area Percentage
Actual adopters 459 56.5
Predicted adopters 484 60 226 68
Actual non-adopters 353 43.5
Predicted non-adopters 328 40 105 32
Total (adopters + non-adopters) 812 20 331 100
Note: In treatment area, 84% of treated are correctly predicted (sensitivity), and 73% of the non-treated are correctly predicted (specificity).
26 The unit is the percentage change in the likelihood of uptake.
27 An important underlying assumption is that after controlling
for observables, unobservables generate little remaining bias.
28 We thank a referee for noting that the difference between
control and treatment kebeles, in terms of the degree of participa-
tion in the PSNP (Table 4), could reflect enhanced financial devel-
opment in the control kebeles. This distinction could create an
omitted location variable that affects both credit rationing and
IBI adoption, which would confound our results and bias the esti-
mation results. We cannot fully rule out this potential bias, but one
of the main assumptions of our double-difference method is that
the difference between unobservables of adopters and non-
adopters in the treatment kebeles is the same as the difference
between unobservables of would-be adopters and would-be non-
adopters in the control kebeles. Even if some program placement
variables are omitted, this assumption is not necessarily violated.
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of robustness tests. We address five groups of
potential biases: (a) misspecification of the
uptake equation, (b) misspecification of the
credit-rationing equation, (c) remaining pro-
gram placement effects, (d) endogeneity bias
and reverse causality, or (e) spillover effects
from adopters to non-adopters.29 With
robustness tests, we can assess the impacts
of these potential biases. Thus, many more
regressions were run than can be included in
the article. The interested reader can find
them in a supplementary appendix online.
The main results still hold. Yet we explicitly
acknowledge that our results still might be
due to unobserved factors that affect both
credit rationing and insurance uptake. There-
fore, we also conduct a placebo test, for which
the findings still hold. The results of the pla-
cebo tests are also available in the Online
Appendix.
Conclusions
Index-based insurance promises a climate risk
management strategy that can benefit the
poor. This article focuses on a question that
has not receivedmuch attention in prior litera-
ture: Does the adoption of index insurance
improve access to financial markets and
reduce credit rationing? Our empirical ana-
lyses focus on Ethiopia and leverage a situa-
tion in which IBI is not yet available in some
areas. With a hybrid identification strategy, in
line with a cross-sectional double-difference
method, we try to control for potential selec-
tion biases by forecasting potential insurance
adopters. With this identification strategy, we
can draw some tentative conclusions about
the causal relationship between adopting IBI
and credit rationing. Overall, the OLS regres-
sion suggests that IBI adoption decreases the
probability of credit rationing by 20%.
We also differentiate supply-side and
demand-side forms of credit rationing. The
impact regressions indicate that IBI reduces












−0.52 −0.67** 0.05 0.02* −0.42* −0.33




1.64** 0.31 −0.02 0.04 0.09 0.04
Constant 4.11*** 6.53*** 0.91*** 0.01 3.43*** 1.77***
Observations 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,143
R2 adjusted 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors with kebeles as the cluster. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10.
Table 9. Impacts of IBI Uptake on Credit Rationing









1.303*** (0.395) 1.147 (0.818)








−0.589** (0.305) −1.300 (0.863)
Constant −2.252**
(1.074)
0.006 (0.144) −2.978*** (0.979) −3.602 (2.607)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation technique Logit OLS Multinominal logit
Observations 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,143
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are based on a cluster (kebele) bootstrap method, performed for a system of equations containing the uptake equation in
table 6 and the credit rationing equation. The bootstrap relies on 750 repetitions. The controls are Age, Education (years), Family size, Extension contact,
District1, District2, Dependency ratio, Dependents, and Cooperative member. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.
29 Because we ignore spillover effects, our estimates may reflect
a lower bound.
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both supply-side rationing (quantity rationing)
and demand-side credit rationing, but the lat-
ter does not appear robust. The nonsignificant
impact on demand-side credit rationing is not
surprising as the insurance contract is a
stand-alone product, for which indemnities
are paid directly to farmers, and the majority
of smallholders lack any valuable collateral
to offer.
The study findings suggest a relatively large
impact of IBI uptake on reducing supply-side
credit rationing. Across various regressions,
we find that the relative risk of being non-
credit rationed rather than supply-side credit
rationed among IBI holders is about two times
the corresponding relative probability for non-
IBI holders. Thus, IBI adoption appears to
enhance smallholders’ access to credit. It also
provides mutual benefits to farmers (bor-
rowers) and lenders. Alleviating supply-side
credit constraints enables farmers to acquire
inputs and enhance productivity. Because
their access to credit overcomes their liquidity
constraints, farmers can employ other risk
management strategies to hedge against
downside production risks. For lenders, lend-
ing to insured farmers reduces the default risk
of lending. In presenting these outcomes, we
take care to note that the findings are based
on the results after one year of program imple-
mentation. It is not necessarily the case that
lenders are more willing to provide credit spe-
cifically to insured applicants. Alternatively,
increased lending could reflect decreased
transaction costs when lenders combine credit
supply with IBI provisioning. Further research
is needed to determine the precise empirical
implications.
Our proposed hybrid method can be used in
settings in which an intervention already has
taken place, such that no pre-intervention
baseline survey is possible. Such a situation,
which is common in reality, precludes either
a standard double-difference method or a ran-
domized controlled trial. Yet our proposed
method is not without limitations. In particu-
lar, the ability to estimate adopters correctly
and obtain unbiased estimates of the coeffi-
cients in the adoption equation is crucial. This
method also relies on the important assump-
tion that unobserved characteristics that affect
both adoption and credit rationing are not cor-
related with observed characteristics that
affect IBI uptake. There is no straightforward
method to test this assumption, so we present
various robustness analyses to increase confi-
dence in the plausibility of our main results;
such analyses might not offer similar confi-
dence in other settings. Because the robust-
ness of our hybrid method approach has not
been tested in alternative settings, it cannot
offer an alternative to well-known, rigorous
methods, like randomized trials. However,
we hope this article encourages continued
research that tests whether our method is
appropriate in various settings, if our results
hold in other settings, andwhether the findings
are robust to the use of other identification
strategies, such as randomized controlled
trials.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material are available at
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
online.
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Appendix
A. Tree diagram illustrating credit rationing
status
Notes:
• Have you applied for a bank loan over the
last five years?
(1) Yes [n = 439].
(2) No [n = 704]
• Has your application been accepted?
(1) Yes [n = 383].
(2) No [n = 56]
• Did you want larger loan at the same inter-
est rate?
(1) Yes [n = 57].
(2) No [n = 326]
• If you did not apply, would a bank now lend
to you if you apply?
(1) Yes [n = 108].
(2) No [n = 317].
(3) I do not know (IDK) [n = 279]
• If you think that a bank would now lend to
you if you apply, why do you not apply?
Indicate reason(s)
(1) I do not need loan [n = 44].
(2) High interest rate [n = 6].
(3) Farming does not give me enough to
repay a debt [n = 11].
(4) I prefer working with my own liquidity
[n = 4].
(5) I do not want to put my collateral at risk
[n = 13].
(6) I do not want to be worried [n = 6].
(7) I prefer informal lenders because formal
lenders are so strict [n = 4].
(8) Formal lenders do not offer refinancing
[n = 5].
(9) The branch is too far away [n = 6].
(10) The lending procedures are too costly
[n = 9].
(11) IDK
Figure A1. Direct elicitation method (Boucher, Guirkinger, and Trivelli 2009)
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• If you were certain that a bank would
approve your application, would you apply?
(1) Yes [n = 121].
(2) No [n = 475].
(3) IDK
• Why not? Indicate reason(s)
(1) I do not need loan [n = 143].
(2) High interest rate [n = 56].
(3) Farming does not give me enough to
repay a debt [n = 66].
(4) I prefer working with my own liquidity
[n = 50].
(5) I do not want to put my collateral at risk
[n = 53].
(6) I do not want to be worried [n = 13].
(7) I prefer informal lenders because formal
lenders are so strict [n = 12].
(8) Formal lenders do not offer refinancing
[n = 42].
(9) The branch is too far away [n = 17].
Table A1. Variables
Dependent variables Variable type and description
Uptake Dummy, equal to 1 for households that bought index-based insurance in 2013,
2014, or both; 0 for others
Credit rationing (1) Dummy, equal to 1 for credit-rationed households and 0 for credit-
unconstrained households
Credit rationing (2) Categorical, equal to 0 for credit-unconstrained, 1 for credit supply–rationed,
and 2 for credit demand–constrained households
Independent variables
Risk aversion Continuous, estimated as the value of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
parameter based on the equationu τð Þ= τ1−CRRA1−CRRA, where u(τ) is the payoff
(utility) of the safe option, and τ is the payoff in the form of the expected
value of a risky option. Payoffs were constructed from a Binswanger (1980)
lottery game that the households played with small, real incentives. We
offered households a choice of a menu of real gambles, at varying levels of
risk and expected payoffs.
Time preference Continuous, an exponential discount rate estimated as the value of δ from the
equation PV =FV 11 + δ
 t
, where PV and FV are present and future values,
and t is the discount period. Households were given a time preference game




Dummy, equal to 1 for households that participated in a product promotion
meeting (campaign) of JICA and OIC and 0 for those that did not
participate. In the expansion area (control kebeles), product promotion
campaigns have taken place.
Peer influence Dummy, equal to 1 for households that indicate that their peers, relatives, or
neighbors who have bought insurance have influenced them to buy IBI, and
0 for others. In the expansion area, households indicated whether peer
influence has convinced them to buy at the moment the insurance becomes
available.
Basis risk Continuous, distance of the household farm to the nearest metrological
station measured in walking hours.
Gender Dummy, equal to 1 if head of the household is male, 0 otherwise
Present-bias or
procrastination
Binary dummy, equal to 1 for households that indicate that, if insurance is
available, they would postpone the uptake decision until the final insurance
sales day, to make a better estimate of future weather conditions.
Draft oxen Number of draft oxen that the household uses for production
Education (years) Household head’s level of education in years of schooling
Distance from market Distance from market
Land size Household’s land holding, measured in a local unit called qarxi, where 1
qarxi = 0.25 hectares
Extension contact Dummy, equal to 1 for households that frequently make contact with
extension agents; 0 for others
Dependents Number of dependents in a family
Dependency ratio Dependents/family size
Additional variables
(Continues)
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Table A2. Additional Descriptive Statistics












Treatment kebeles (adopters) 7.3 0.1 0.9 2.5 2.1
Treatment kebeles (non-
adopters)
6.2 0.1 0.6 2.5 1.6
Control kebeles 7.4 0.1 0.5 1.3 2.3
Observations 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,143
Note: The statistics in Table A2 refer to the mean of uptakers in the treatment kebeles; the mean of non-uptakers in the treatment kebeles; and the mean of
households in the control (expansion) kebeles.
Table A1. Continued
Dependent variables Variable type and description
Population density The ratio of the households’ family size to land size.
Housing quality An indicator variable indicating whether the household has an iron
corrugated house
Livestock owned in TLU The size of livestock owned by the household measured in TLU, which is a
standard unit of measurement.
Access to non-farm
employment
Indicator variable equal to 1 if a household has non-farm employment
PSNP dependent Indicator variable equal to 1 if the household is a beneficiary of a productive
safety net program
Net salvage value of
physical assets
Current value of the household’s usable assets as estimated by the household
Saving Household monetary and non-monetary (cereal storage) savings in Birr
Wealth index An index constructed on the basis of information from various plant asset
compositions owned by households and the salvage values of each asset in
our data set.
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